Judge Robinson Denies Motion to Transfer Venue of Versata's Patent Infringement Action Against Callidus

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Versata Software, Inc., et al. v. Callidus Software Inc., Civil Action  No. 12-931-SLR (D.Del., May 16, 2013), the Court denied the motion to transfer venue to the Northern District of California of defendant Callidus Software Inc. (“Callidus”). The Court also denied Callidus’ motion to dismiss. Id. at *10. 

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

By way of background, Plaintiffs Versata Software, Inc. and Versata Development Group, Inc. (collectively, “Versata”) are both Delaware corporations with their principal place of business in Texas. Defendant Callidus is also a Delaware corporation but has its principal place of business in California. Id. at *1. Versata filed this action alleging that certain software products of Callidus, including Callidus’ SPM Suite, and specifically including Callidus’ True Comp and TrueProducer products infringe U.S. Patent Nos. 7,958,024 (“the ‘024 patent”), 7,908,304 (“the ‘304 patent”), and 7,904,326 (“the ‘326 patent”). In opposition to the motion to transfer, Callidus alleged the accused products were primarily designed in California, any continued maintenance is done in California, and its internal servers, which contain the technical documents for the accused products, sales and marketing documents and other company documents, are located in California. Id. at *1-2.

After analyzing the Jumara factors and referring to the analytical framework set forth in Helicos, the Court found that Versata chose a legitimate forum which all parties have in common – their state of incorporation (Delaware), the Jumara convenience factors did not weigh in favor of transfer, and the Jumara public interest factors did not weigh in favor of transfer. Id. at *2-6. Thus, the Court denied Callidus’ motion to transfer venue to the Northern District of California. Id. at *10.
 

Judge Stark Issues Markman Opinion Construing 36 Terms in Dispute in Patent Infringement Action Against Globus Medical

By Memorandum Opinion entered in Depuy Synthes Products, LLC v.Globus Medical, Inc., C.A. No. 11-652-LPS (D.Del., May 7, 2013), The Honorable Leonard P. Stark construed thirty-six (36) disputed terms found in U.S. Patent Nos.7,846,207, 7,862,616, and 7,875,076 (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”).

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Golden Bridge Technology, Inc.'s Request for Court to Modify Order Granting Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement In Favor of Apple

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Apple Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 10-428-SLR (D.Del., April 25, 2013), the Court, as a practical matter, denied plaintiff Golden Bridge Technology, Inc.’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Order of April 9, 2013 granting summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of defendant Apple. The Court noted that, although it previously granted the motion for reconsideration, it did explain at the time that it was only granting to review the merits of the motion and not to grant the relief sought. The Court apologized for any confusion this may have caused. Id. at *1, fn1. The Court ultimately concluded that, despite plaintiff’s supplemental submissions and citations to the record, there is no expert testimony or evidence of record that raises a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment under the Court’s claim construction. Id. at 6.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Grants Apple's Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement Against Golden Bridge Technology, Inc.

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Apple Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 10-428-SLR (D.Del., April 9, 2013), the Court granted the motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of defendant Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) as to the asserted claims in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,574,267 C1 (“the ‘267 patent”), as reexamined, and 7,359,427 (“the ‘427 patent”) (collectively, “the patents-in-suit”). In granting Apple’s motion, the Court concluded that “the accused devices do not directly infringe any of the asserted claims because they do not practice the limitation of ‘spreading an access preamble’ or a ‘spread access preamble,’ which is recited in each asserted claim. As there can be no indirect infringement without direct infringement, the accused devices or their methods of operation also do not indirectly infringe any of the asserted claims.” See id. at 17.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Andrews Grants in Part Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert in Patent Infringement Action

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-157-RGA (D.Del., March 7, 2013), the Court granted in part the Daubert motion of defendant Cisco Systems, Inc. to exclude the proposed testimony of plaintiff’s expert on direct infringement and secondary considerations. Specifically, the Court excluded plaintiff expert’s conclusions about whether and how particular customers actually used the accused products and five of six of his opinions about secondary considerations of non-obviousness finding such conclusions and opinions not reliable because they were not the product of the expert’s scientific or call center expertise or his direct knowledge. Id. at 3-7.

A copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Magistrate Judge Thynge Recommends Denial of Defendant's Motion to Stay Patent Infringement Action Pending Inter Partes Reexamination

By Report and Recommendation in Imagevision.net, Inc. v. Internet Payment Exchange, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-054-GMS-MPT (D.Del., February 25, 2013), The Honorable Mary Pat Thynge has recommended denying the motion of defendant Internet Payment Exchange to stay pending the inter partes reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 7,567,925 (“the ‘925 patent”) by the United States Patent and Trade Office (“PTO”). After analyzing the required factors, Judge Thynge concluded that (1) the relative status of the litigation and the reexamination proceedings do not weigh in favor of a stay, (2) the possible simplification of the issues for trial weighs in favor of a stay given that the PTO has preliminary rejected all claims of the ‘925 patent under the heightened reexamination standard of the America Invent’s Act (“AIA”), and (3) the balancing of the undue prejudice to plaintiff if a stay were granted against the hardship or inequity to defendant if a stay were denied weigh in favor of a stay. Id. at 5-16.

A copy of the Report and Recommendation is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Texas Instruments' Motion to Transfer Patent Case to Northern District of Texas

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Cradle IP, LLC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-1254-SLR (D.Del., February 13, 2013), the Court denied the motion to transfer venue filed by defendant Texas Instruments, Inc. After analyzing the Jumara factors, the Court found that Texas Instruments had not met its burden of persuading the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the Jumara factors warranted transfer of the patent infringement action to the Northern District of Texas. Id. at 9.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Chief Judge Sleet Grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Declaratory Action Seeking Judgment of Non-Infringement

By Memorandum Order entered by Chief Judge Gregory M. Sleet in Woodbolt Distribution, LLC v. Natural Alternatives International, Inc., Civil Action No,. 11-1266-GMS (D.Del., January 23, 2013), the Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint of plaintiff which sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,067,381.  Of particular note was the fact that the same day that plaintiff initiated the declaratory judgment action in the District of Delaware, defendant later filed a patent infringement action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.  Id. at 1.  Through its motion, defendant sought to dismiss the declaratory judgment filed in the District of Delaware and have the case transferred to the Southern District of Texas.  After analyzing the issues, the Court concluded that, under the circumstances, discretionary dismissal was appropriate in this instance and the 'first-filed rule" did not preclude dismissal.  Id. at 2-9.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.

 

Judge Andrews Grants in Substantial Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss IP Venture's Claims of Indirect Infringement and Willfulness

By Memorandum Order entered in IPVenture Inc. v. Lenovo Group, Limited, et al., Civil Action No. 11-588-RGA (D.Del., January 8, 2013), the Honorable Richard G. Andrews granted in substantial part the motions of defendant Dell and other defendants seeking the dismissal of the claims of indirect infringement and willfulness asserted in the Second Amended Complaint of plaintiff IPVenture Inc. (“IPVenture”).

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

In short, in its Second Amended Complaint, IPVenture asserted that defendants were infringing four patents - all of which concern thermal and power management for computer systems. Although the Second Amended Complaint is 81 pages long, its allegations are in material respects, the same as to all defendants. The Court had previously dismissed similar claims of indirect infringement and willfulness in IPVenture’s First Amended Complaint without prejudice.

Defendants’ asserted four grounds of dismissal in their motions to dismiss: (1) the indirect infringement claims did not properly allege direct infringement by defendants’ customers; (2) the indirect infringement claims did not properly allege defendants’ intent that their customers infringe the patents and knew that their customers actions would constitute infringement; (3) contributory infringement was not properly alleged; and (4) the allegations of willfulness were not sufficient. Id. at 3.

Upon evaluation of defendants’ motions and the factual allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court noted that, although the Complaint nearly doubled in size, almost nothing of substance was added. Id. at 5. The Court rejected defendants’ first asserted basis for dismissal noting that the allegations of direct infringement as to defendants’ customer do not have to identify specific customers. Id. at 4. The Court accepted defendants’ remaining bases for dismissal finding insufficient factual allegations of the required knowledge of defendants prior to the filing of the lawsuit and/or that defendants acted in an improper manner despite any required knowledge. Id. at 4-5. Given that the Court had previously dismissed the claims of indirect infringement and willfulness without prejudice, this time the Court dismissed the claims of indirect infringement (except those as to post-filing of Complaint) and willfulness as to three of the asserted patents (except those as to post-filing of Complaint) with prejudice. Id. at 5.
 

Judge Stark Issues Markman Opinion Construing 20 Disputed Terms in Patents-In-Suit in Intellectual Ventures Case

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., et al., Civil Action No. 10-1067-LPS (D.Del., December 12, 2012), the Court issued its claim construction opinion construing twenty (20) disputed terms found in U.S. Patent Numbers 6,460,050 (“the ‘050 patent”), 6,073,142 (“the ‘142 patent”), 5,987,610 (“the’610 patent”), and 7,506,155 (“the ’155 patent”).

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Grants in Part and Denies in Part Defendants' Motion for Judgment on Pleadings in Patent Infringement Action

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Senju Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., et el. v. Lupin Limited, et al., Civil Action No. 11-271-SLR (Consol.) (D.Del., December 7, 2012), the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants Lupin’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.

A copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Chief Judge Sleet Denies Apple's Motion to Transfer Patent Infringement Action

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet in Smart Audio Technologies, LLC v. Apple, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-134-GMS (D.Del., November 16, 2012), the Court denied Apple’s motion to transfer the action to the Northern District of California. In denying the motion to transfer, the Court explained and examined the differences in the two approaches to analyzing the Jumara factors that have developed in the District of Delaware and referred to those approaches as (1) the “Affymetrix approach” and (2) the “modern approach.” Id. at 3-10. Ultimately, the Court found that the two approaches are quite similar and may not result in any practical difference in the outcome, although it did recognize that there appears to be some double-counting of plaintiff’s forum choice under the modern approach. Id. at 10-11. After analyzing the Jumara factors employing the language of the modern approach, the Court concluded that Apple failed to show that the balance of the factors weighed strongly in favor of transfer. Id. at 21.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Andrews Denies Dell's Motion to Transfer in Round Rock Patent Infringement Action

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in Round Rock Research, LLC v. Dell, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-976-RGA (D.Del., November 15, 2012), the Court denied defendant Dell, Inc.’s motion to transfer the action to the Northern District of California. In denying the motion to transfer, the Court carefully analyzed and weigned all of the Jumara factors and distinguished the facts of the case from the facts of In re Link_A_Media by highlighting that both parties are Delaware corporations and neither is principally based in the Northern District of California. Id. at 3-9.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Chief Judge Sleet Adopts Magistrate Judge Thynge's Recommendation to Deny Defendants' Motion to Stay Patent Infringement Action Pending Reexamination by the PTO

By Memorandum Opinion entered by Chief Judge Gregory M. Sleet in Imagevision.net, Inc. v. Internet Payment Exchange, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-054-GMS-MPT, the Court adopted the ultimate recommendation of Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge and denied the motion of defendant, Internet Payment Exchange, Inc. (“IPX”), requesting a stay pending the conclusion of the inter partes reexamination of the patent-in-suit by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “PTO”). IPX had previously filed objections to Judge Thynge’s Report and Recommendation to deny IPX’s motion to stay and, among other things, argued that an incorrect overarching legal standard was applied. Id. at 2.

In adopting Judge Thynge’s ultimate recommendation over IPX’s objections, the Court found that the statement of the applicable legal standard set forth in Judge Thynge’s Report and Recommendation is correct and not contrary to the law, the decision of whether to grant a stay is ultimately left to the court’s discretion, and the decision to deny the stay was not clearly erroneous or contrary to the law. Id. at 9.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity Under 35 U.S.C. § 305

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Exelis Inc. v. Cellco Partnership, et al., C.A. No. 09-190-LPS (D.Del., November 6, 2012), the Court issued its rulings on several motions for summary judgment and Daubert motions filed by plaintiff and defendants. Among other things, the Court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment asserting invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 5,365,450 (“the ‘450 patent”) on grounds that plaintiff violated 35 U.S.C. § 305 by pursuing reexamination of the ‘450 patent for an improper purposes. Id. at 8.

In their motion, defendants contended that plaintiff pursued reexamination for the purpose of “fixing” the claim construction ruling rendered by Chief Judge Sleet in a prior action that involved the ‘450 patent. Id. at 7. During that prior action, Chief Judge Sleet issued a claim construction ruling that was later vacated by the Court on joint motion of the parties after the parties reached a settlement. Id. at 2.

In denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment of invalidity under Section 305, the Court found that “no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Plaintiff violated Section 305 by pursuing reexamination of the ‘450 patent for an improper purpose.” Id. at 7. The Court noted that plaintiff identified several proper purposes for seeking reexamination, including to address the prior art asserted in the prior litigation and to correct typographical errors in the original patent claims, and defendants offered no evidence - other than their mere suspicions – to counter plaintiff’s contentions. Id. at 7. Thus, the Court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment and found that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment that the reexamination was not filed for an improper purpose. Id. at 8.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Expert It Consulted from Serving as Expert for Defendant in Same Action

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-54-SLR (D.Del., October 10, 2012), the Court denied Plaintiff Butamax’s request attempting to exclude Dr. Ron Caspi from serving as an expert witness for Defendant Gevo. Butamax claimed that it had entered a confidentiality agreement and consulted with Dr. Caspi in the same action prior to his retention by Gevo and had shared some attorney work-product with him during brief telephone conversations. Id. at 3-5.

In evaluating Butamax’s motion to disqualify, the Court recognized that, although there is no bright line rule for expert disqualification, “courts have generally adopted a two-part inquiry: (1) was it objectively reasonable for the party seeking disqualification to have concluded that a confidential relationship existed with the expert; and (2) was confidential or privileged information actually disclosed to the expert.” Id. at 2. The burden of proof of those factors rests with the party seeking disqualification. Id. at 3.

After analyzing the pertinent factors, the Court found that there was a confidential relationship created between Butamax’s counsel and Dr. Caspi. Id. at 5. However, the Court also found that the comments made to Dr. Caspi by a junior lawyer working on the Butamax legal team in response to the hypothetical posed by Dr. Caspi – which Butamax claimed constituted attorney work-product - did not constitute confidential information sufficient to disqualify Dr. Caspi from consulting for Gevo. Id. at 6.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Judge Stark Denies Patent Owner's Motion to Hold Defendant in Contempt of Court's Prior Permanent Injunction Order

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in nCube Corporation (now Arris Group, Inc.) v. SeaChange International Inc., C.A. No. 01-011-LPS (D.Del., October 9, 2012), the Court denied the motion of Plaintiff Arris Group, Inc. (“Arris”) seeking to hold Defendant SeaChange International Inc. (“SeaChange”) in contempt of the permanent injunction order entered by the Court in 2006 after Arris obtained a jury verdict in its favor that SeaChange had willfully infringed the asserted claims of its patent - U.S. Patent No. 5,805,804 (“the ‘804 patent”). In denying Arris’ motion for contempt, the Court found that (1) Arris failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is no colorable difference between SeaChange’s modified ITV system and SeaChange’s old ITV system that was previously found to infringe; and (2) Arris failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that SeaChange’s modified ITV system actually infringes claim 4 of the ‘804 patent. Id. at 3-9.

Although the Court denied the motion for contempt, the Court made it clear that its findings and ruling do not include a finding that SeaChange’s modified ITV system does not infringe the ‘804 patent and/or any finding about whether Arris would be able to prevail under the lower preponderance of the evidence standard in a new action asserting that SeaChange’s modified ITV system infringes the ‘804 patent. Id. at 11-12.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Grants British Telecommunication's Motion to Amend Complaint to Add New Alleged Infringement Claims Against Google

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in British Telecommunications PLC v. Google Inc., C.A. No. 11-1249-LPS (D.Del., September 20, 2012), the Court granted Plaintiff British Telecommunications PLC’s motion for leave to file a First Supplemental Complaint to include claims of infringement against a new product and/or service introduced by defendant Google after the filing of the original complaint and claims of indirect infringement based on Google’s knowledge of the patents-in-suit since at least the date of the filing of the original complaint on December 15, 2011.

In granting Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, the Court recognized the Third Circuit’s liberal approach to granting leave to amend and found there was no evidence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive by Plaintiff. Id. at 2. The Court also rejected Defendant’s argument that the motion was futile because Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim of indirect infringement. Id. In doing so, Judge Stark made it clear that, for purposes of indirect infringement occurring after the filing date, his expressed view is that “an accused infringer is on notice of the patent(s)-in-suit once an initial pleading identifies the patents-in-suit.” Id. (quoting Softview LLC v. Apple Inc., 2012 WL 3061027, at *7 (D.Del., July 26, 2012).

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Magistrate Judge Thynge Denies Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Early Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Infringement

By Memorandum Order entered in Neology, Inc. v. Federal Signal Corp., et al., Civil Action No. 11-672-LPS-MPT (D.Del., September 21, 2012), the Honorable Mary Pat Thynge denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an early motion for partial summary judgment after finding that there was no good cause to modify the scheduling order. Leave of Court was required because the scheduling order provides that “no case dispositive motion may be filed at a time before” November 4, 2013, “[u]nless the Court directs otherwise.” Id. at 2.

Plaintiff sought leave to file its early motion for partial summary judgment because the Court, in denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, adopted plaintiff’s proposed construction as to certain terms in two patents. Id. Defendants responded asserting, among other things, that plaintiff’s motion was based on a false premise that the case was done with respect to claim construction and infringement issues as to the claims at issue. Id. at 3.

In denying plaintiff’s motion for leave, the Court noted that, although it did adopt plaintiff’s proposed claim construction as to certain terms for the purpose of preliminary injunction, “a conclusion of law such as claim construction is subject to change upon the development of the record after a district court’s decision on a motion for preliminary injunction.” Id. at 4. Thus, the initial construction for purposes of the preliminary injunction was only tentative and subject to being revisited upon development of the full record. Id. 

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.


 


 

Judge Stark Grants Defendants' Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings Based on Collateral Estoppel in ANDA Patent Infringement Action

By Memorandum Opinion entered in Galderma Laboratories Inc., et al. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLC, et al., C.A. No. 11-1106-LPS (D.Del., September 7, 2012), the Honorable Leonard P. Stark granted defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings based on collateral estoppel after finding that the issue of whether a product containing 40 mg of doxycycline, administered once daily, infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 7,232,572 and 7,211,267 (referred to as the “Ashley patents”) was previously litigated and decided against the Galderma plaintiffs in a related ANDA action captioned Research Found. of State Univ. of New York v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 809 F. Supp.2d 896 (D.Del. 2011) (referred to as the “Mylan Action”). In doing so, the Court found that the four elements necessary for collateral estoppel to properly apply were established by defendants in their motion and/or conceded by the Galderma plaintiffs: (1) the previous determination was necessary to the decision; (2) the identical issue was previously litigated; (3) the issue was actually decided on the merits and the decision was final and valid; and (4) the party being precluded from re-litigating the issue was adequately represented in the previous action. Id. at 3-8.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Issues Markman Opinion Construing 12 Terms in Dispute in Patent Infringement Action

By Memorandum Opinion entered in Cadence Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. v. Paddock Laboratories, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 11-733-LPS (D.Del., August 22, 2012), the Honorable Leonard P. Stark construed twelve disputed terms found in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,028,022 and 6,992,218 (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”).

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Issues Markman Opinion Construing 15 Terms in Dispute in Patent Infringement Action

By Memorandum Opinion entered in St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. Acer, Inc., et al., the Honorable Leonard P. Stark construed fifteen disputed terms found in U.S. Patent Nos. 5,710,929, 5,758,175, 5,892,959, 6,079,025, 5,630,163, 5,613,130 and 5,961,617 (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”).

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Issues Markman Opinion Construing 16 Terms in Dispute in Patent Infringement Action Against Apple and Others

By Memorandum Opinion entered in St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10-982-LPS (D.Del., August 7, 2012), the Honorable Leonard P. Stark construed sixteen disputed terms found in U.S. Patent Nos. 5,710,929, 6,079,025, 5,758175, 5,892,959, 5,630,163 and 5,822,610 (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”).

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Grants Defendant's Motion to Stay in Declaratory Judgment Action Pending Application of First-Filed Rule By Other Federal District Where Infringement Action Was First-Filed

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Cellectis S.A. v. Precision Biosciences, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 11-890-SLR and 12-204-SLR (D.Del., August 6, 2012), the Court granted the motion of defendant Precision Biosciences, Inc. to stay the declaratory judgment actions filed by plaintiff Cellectis S.A. in the District of Delaware pending a determination by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina regarding the applicability of the first-filed rule in the infringement actions filed by Precision against Cellectis in that district. In its analysis, the Court recognized that Precision filed the patent infringement action first in the Eastern District of North Carolina and rejected Cellectis’ argument that the first-filed rule should not apply because the North Carolina court allegedly lacks jurisdiction over Cellectis. Id. at *5. The Court explained that Cellectis had previously sued Precision in North Carolina, should not oppose litigating in a court where it previously litigated without complaint, and the North Carolina court should be allowed to make the determination in the first instance as the first-filed court. See id. at *5-6.

A complete copy of the Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Denies Plaintiff's Requests for Reconsideration or Reargument of Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Cooper Notification, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 09-685-LPS (D.Del., July 16, 2012), the Court denied the requests of Plaintiff Cooper Notification, Inc. for reconsideration or reargument, leave to file supplemental infringement reports, and clarification of the Court's claim construction in connection with the Court's prior Opinion and Order (D.I. 568 and 569) granting defendants' motions for summary judgment of non-infringement.  The Court concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the standard for reconsideration or any of the other relief requested, entered judgment against Plaintiff Cooper Notification, Inc. and for Defendants, Twitter, Inc., Everbridge, Inc. and Federal Signal Corp., and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case.  Id. at 4.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.

Judge Andrews Grants Customer Defendants' Motion to Stay Patent Infringement Action Pending Resolution of Declaratory Judgment Action Filed Against Plaintiff by the Customer Defendants' Supplier

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Richard G. Andrews in Pragmatus Telecom, LLC v. Advanced Store Company, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 12-088-RGA (D.Del., July 10, 2012), the Court granted the motion of the customer defendants to stay the patent infringement actions against them pending resolution of the declaratory judgment action filed against plaintiff by the supplier of the customer defendants. Finding that the declaratory judgment action would simplify the issues for trial in the patent infringement action against the customer defendants, and that plaintiff would not likely suffer any undue prejudice, the Court concluded a stay in favor of the customer defendants was warranted. See id. at 2.

A complete copy of the Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Andrews Denies Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees Premised On Exceptional Case Claim

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Richard G. Andrews in Commonwealth Research Group LLC v. Lattice Semiconductor Corp., et al., Civil Action No. 11-655-RGA (D.Del., June 28, 2012), the Court denied defendant’s motion for attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 finding that defendant did not prove that the litigation was brought in subjective bad faith. During his analysis, Judge Andrews noted that “[w]hile I suspect that the litigation may be objectively baseless, I cannot so conclude, at least in part due to the termination of this case before a deposition was taken, before the completion of claim construction briefing, before the holding of a Markman hearing, and before any actual claim construction by me.” Id. at 5.

A complete copy of the Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Denies Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Tarkus Imaging, Inc. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10-63-LPS (D.Del., June 14, 2012), the Court denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment of non-infringement, invalidity and no indirect infringement concluding that the record evidence raised genuine issues of material fact. The Court explained that, in large part, the subject “summary judgment motions present a ‘battle of the experts’ that is not amenable to resolution prior to the presentation of evidence, including testimony.” Id. at 2.

A complete copy of the Opinion is attached.
 

Magistrate Judge Burke Recommends Application of First-Filed Rule and Transfer of Patent Infringement Action to Northern District of California

By Report and Recommendation entered in Fuisz Pharma LLC v. Theranos, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-1061-SLR-CJB (D.Del., May 18, 2012), the Honorable Christopher J. Burke recommends that the Court grant the motion of defendant Theranos to dismiss, stay or transfer in part by transferring the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Specifically, Judge Burke recommends that the Court find that the first-filed rule applies, that the action filed by Theranos and its founder on October 26, 2011 against Fuisz Pharma and individual members of the Fuisz family in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California be considered the first-filed action, and that the patent infringement action filed by Fuisz Pharma on November 1, 2011 in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware be transferred to the Northern District of California. See id. at 8-35.

Of significant distinction in this matter appears to be the fact that the previously filed California action includes inventorship claims asserted under the Patent Act by Theranos alleging that the Fuisz defendants allegedly misappropriated Theranos’ and its founder’s confidential information and used that information to obtain the patent-in-suit in both actions, U.S. Patent No. 7,824,612 (the “’612 patent”), without crediting Theranos and its founder as the true inventors.  See id. at 2-3. 

A complete copy of the Report and Recommendation is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Amazon's Motion to Dismiss Complaint That Claims Patent Infringement by Amazon's Kindle Products

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Technology Innovations, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-690-SLR (D.Del., April 25, 2012), the Court denied the motion of defendant Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiff Technology Innovations, LLC (“Plaintiff”) for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Amazon asserted in support of its motion that there in no possible construction for “book” that would cover a Kindle and, thus, claim construction was not necessary and Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim of infringement. Id. at 2-3. In denying the motion, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s complaint did plead adequate notice of direct infringement required by Form 18 and it would be premature to dismiss the complaint prior to claim construction. Id. at 4. The Court indicated that it was not prepared to engage in claim construction, construing the terms “book” and “printed information” of United States Patent No. 5,517,407 (“the ‘407 patent”), at this early stage of the proceedings and without discovery or motion practice. Id.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Judge Thynge Grants in Part and Denies in Significant Part the Bill of Costs of Amazon After Adjudication in Its Favor

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable May Pat Thynge in Cordance Corporation v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-491-MPT (D.Del., April 11, 2012), the Court granted in part and denied in part the bill of costs of defendant Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) after adjudication in its favor on the patent infringement claims filed against it by plaintiff Cordance Corporation (“Cordance”). Significantly, although the Court granted Amazon’s request for printing and copying costs in the amount of $1,378.78, filing fees in the amount of $1,498.99, deposition expenses in the amount of $1,152.80 and witness fees in the amount of $27,575.37, the Court completely denied Amazon’s request for exemplification costs in the amount of $51,323.62 and significantly limited the ediscovery costs granted to Amazon to $2,721.52 out of the $447,694.63 that Amazon claimed as ediscovery costs. Id. at 20-21.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Andrews Grants Motions to Stay in Three Round Rock Research Cases

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in Round Rock Research LLC v. Dole Food Company Inc., Civil Action No. 11-1239-RGA (D.Del., April 6, 2012), Round Rock Research LLC v. Gap Inc., Civil Action No. 11-1241-RGA (D.Del., April 6, 2012), and Round Rock Research LLC v. Hanesbrands Inc., Civil Action No. 11-1242-RGA (D.Del., April 6, 2012), the Court granted defendants’ motions to stay pending reexamination of the patents-in-suit. After analyzing the three pertinent factors the Court must consider in evaluating a motion to stay, the Court in its reasoning stated that “[c]onsidering all the circumstances, this seems pretty close to the classic case for granting a stay pending reexamination. The prejudice to the Plaintiff, including any tactical disadvantage is not great, and the other factors all clearly weigh in favor of granting the stay.” Id. at 4.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Andrews Issues Claim Construction Ruling on Disputed Terms of Patents Covering Drug Used to Treat Pediatric ADHD

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in Shire LLC, et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 10-329-RGA (D.Del., March 22, 2012), the Court issued its claim construction ruling on the disputed terms of three patents, U.S. Patent Numbers 5,854,290, 6,287,599 and 6,811,794, covering the drug Intuniv®, which is used to treat pediatric ADHD.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Cordis's Renewed Motion for Judgment As A Matter of Law as to Jury's Award of Lost Profits in Patent Infringement Action

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Boston Scientific Corporation, et al. v. Cordis Corporation, Civil Action No. 10-315-SLR (D.Del., March 13, 2012), the Court denied the motion of defendant Cordis Corporation requesting the Court to disturb the jury verdict and grant Cordis’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. In support of its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, Cordis alleged that the jury’s verdict - which the parties agreed included an award to Boston Scientific of lost profits based on the normal profit margin per unit of sales of the product that allegedly declined in sales because of the infringing products - was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 7. Cordis also alleged that Boston Scientific had not proven that the introduction of the products found to infringe the patent at issue was the “but-for cause” of the decline of sales of the Cordis product. Id.

Upon evaluation of the evidence presented during trial, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of lost profits in the case and denied Cordis’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 25. A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Renders Court's Markman Rulings in Patent Infringement Action Filed Against Amusement Park Operators

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Magnetar Technologies Corp., et al. v. Six Flag Theme Parks Inc., et al., Civil Action 07-127-LPS-MPT (D.Del., February 1, 2012), the Court issued its Markman construction of the five claim terms and/or phrases as used in U.S. Patent Numbers 5,277,125 (“the ‘125 patent”) and 6,659,237 (”the ‘237 patent”) that were in dispute.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Issues Court's Rulings on Several Dispositive Motions Filed by Parties in Infringement Action

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Ladatech, LLC v. Illumina, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 09-627-SLR (D.Del., January 24, 2012), the Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment of noninfringement with respect to defendant Illumina’s cluster generation products (alone) and the use of third-party prep kits with those products, but denied defendants’ motion in all other respects. The Court also denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment of invalidity and expiration, and granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment of no anticipation by the Saiki and/or Liang articles. Id. at 46.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Agrees with Defendants that Material Contained in Two Patents Amount to Single Reference for Purposes of Anticipation Defense

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Sunovion Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Dey Pharma, L.P., et al., Civil Action 06-113-LPS (D.Del., January 18, 2012), the Court agreed with defendants that British patent, GB 1 298 494 (“the GB ‘494 patent”) adequately incorporates by reference the practical utility of the racemic compounds separately described in British patent, GB 1 200 886 (“the GB ‘886 patent”), such that the pertinent material from the two patents can be properly considered a “single reference” for purposes of defendants’ invalidity defense based on anticipation.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Chief Judge Sleet Denies Parties' Post-Trial Motions After Jury Returns Verdict for Defendant on Infringement Claims

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Gregory M. Sleet in Grape Technology Group, Inc., et al. v. Jingle Networks, Inc., Civil Action No. 08-408-GMS (D.Del., January 9, 2012), the Court denied all three of the post-trial motions filed by the parties which consisted of the motion of plaintiffs for a new trial, the renewed motion of defendant for judgment as a matter of law, and the motion of defendant for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285. Following a six day trial, the jury had previously rendered a unanimous verdict in favor of defendant Jingle Networks on the issue of infringement with respect to all claims, but also found in favor of plaintiffs on the claims of invalidity. Id. at 1. After considering the entire record, the parties’ post-trial motions and the applicable law, the Court decided to deny all of the parties’ post-trial motions. Id. at 2-23.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Defendant's Motion to Sever or Stay the Claims Asserted Against It

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Helicos Biosciences Corp. v. Pacific Biosciences of California, et al., Civil Action No. 10-735-SLR (December 22, 2011), the Court denied the motion of Defendant Life Technologies Corporation (“Life”) to sever or stay the claims asserted against it in plaintiff’s complaint. In its motion to sever or stay, Life claimed that it did not commercialize the technology accused of infringement. Id. at 1-2. Life also asserted that the other defendants accused of infringement were its direct competitors and, absent any allegation that Life’s activities or products overlapped with the other defendants in any way, the claims against Life should proceed separately in order to protect Life from an expensive and potentially harmful discovery process. Id. at 2.

The Court found that an issue of fact existed as to whether Life continued to make presentations about the accused Starlight technology after February 2010 and whether such activities would constitute an infringing “offer for sale.” Id. at 3-4. Thus, in light of the commonalities in the accused technologies and the overlap of the accused patents, the Court denied Life’s motion to sever or stay the claims against it. Id. at 5.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

District of Delaware Adopts Revised Default Standard for Discovery, Including Electronically Stored Information

On December 8, 2011, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware adopted a "Default Standard for Discovery, Including Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”)". Among other things, the revised Default Standard specifies certain information that must be included in the parties’ initial disclosures and, in patent cases, also sets deadlines for the following:  (1) plaintiffs to identify the accused product(s) and the asserted patent(s) they allegedly infringe, and to produce the file history for each asserted patent, (2) defendants to produce to plaintiffs core technical documents related to the accused product(s) to plaintiffs, (3) plaintiffs to produce to defendants initial infringement contentions, and (4) defendants to produce to plaintiffs initial invalidity contentions.

A copy of the Default Standard in its entirety is attached.
 

Judge Stark Denies Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration Based on Provision of America Invents Act

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Softview LLC v. Apple Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 10-389-LPS (D.Del., December 7, 2011), the Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider its September 30, 2011 Order granting Plaintiff Softview’s Motion to Amend Its Complaint to add parties and accused devices utilizing Android software.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

In their Motion, Defendants, Apple Inc. and AT&T Mobility LLC, asserted two grounds for reconsideration. Id. at 2. First, Defendants asserted that new authorities regarding the requirements for permissive joinder under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2)(A) abrogated the cases on which Softview’s motion to amend relied. Id. In other words, Defendants asserted that Section 299 of the America Invents Act (“AIA”) provides that “accused infringers may not be joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each have infringed the patent or patents in suit.” Id. at 2-3. However, Defendants conceded that the new Section 299 applied to civil actions commenced on or after the date of the enactment of the AIA - September 16, 2011. Id. at 3. Thus, the Court found that the new Section 299 was not “an intervening change in controlling law” in this action. Id. Likewise, the Court found that district court decisions issued subsequent to the briefing on Softview’s motion also did not constitute an intervening change in controlling law. Id.

Second, Defendants asserted that there was a “need to correct a clear error of law regarding joinder” in the Court’s September 30, 2011 Order. Id. The Court, however, agreed with Softview that Defendants simply reargued their same position previously asserted rather than showing a clear error of law by the Court. Thus, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration. Id.
 

Magistrate Judge Burke Recommends that Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Be Granted in Part

By Report and Recommendation entered by The Honorable Christopher J. Burke in Eastman Chemical Co. v. Alphapet Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 09-971-LPS-CJB (D.Del., November 10, 2011), the Court granted in part defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the breach of contract and trade secret misappropriation claims asserted by Plaintiff. The Complaint alleged claims against two of the five defendants for patent infringement, a breach of contract claim against four of the five defendants, and a claim of misappropriation of trade secrets against all five defendants. Id. at 1. The Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in part by dismissing without prejudice the breach of contract claim against one of the two defendants it was asserted against and dismissing any claim of breach of implied contract against all defendants. Id. at 2. Defendants’ motion was denied in all other respects. Id.

A copy of the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Burke is attached hereto.
 

Judge Stark Denies Plaintiffs' Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction But Indicates Court's Intent to Resolve Ownership of Patents-in-Suit on Expedited Basis

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., et al. v. S3 Graphics Co., Ltd., et al., Civil Action No. 11-965-LPS (D.Del., November 8, 2011 (public version)), the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking an Order from the Court directing Defendants to file papers in a pending, related investigation by the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) seeking dismissal of the ITC proceeding. However, in its Order, the Court did state its intent to enter a Scheduling Order in the case that will result in expedited case dispositive motions and/or a trial on the merits of the issue concerning the ownership of the patents-in-suit. Id. at 2.

A copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Grants In Part Plaintiff's Motion to Preclude Defendant from Adducing Improper Damages Testimony from Expert

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Systems, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 04-1199-SLR (D.Del., October 31, 2011), the Court granted in part plaintiff SRI International’s motion to preclude improper damages testimony by defendant Symantec Corporation’s expert during the damages trial. Id. at 9. The Court also granted in part defendant Symantec Corporation’s motion to limit the testimony of plaintiff SRI International’s damages expert during the damages trial. Id. at 9-10.

A copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Judge Stark Grants Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Invalidity for Failure to Disclose Best Mode

By Order, dated September 22, 2011, and Opinion later entered explaining the Court’s reasoning by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, in Ateliers De La Haute-Garonne, et al. v. Broetje Automation-USA Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 09-598-LPS (D.Del., September 26, 2011, unsealed October 4, 2011), the Court granted the motion of defendants Broetje Automation-USA, Inc. and Bröetje-Automation GMBH (collectively, “Broetje”) for partial summary judgment of invalidity for failure to disclose the best mode as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1.

A copy of the Court's Opinion is attached.
 

In support of its motion, Broetje asserted two best mode defenses. First, Broetje asserted that the patents-in-suit failed to adequately disclose joint inventor Bornes’s subject belief that tubes with “five grooves” or passageways were the best mode of practicing the claimed invention. Id. at 8. Second, Broetje asserted that the patents-in-suit failed to adequately disclose joint inventor Auriol’s subjective belief that tubes with an “odd number” of grooves were the best mode of carrying out the claimed invention. Id.

In opposition to Broetje’s motion, plaintiffs made, among others, two legal arguments to Broetje’s best mode theories. First, plaintiffs contended that, in cases of joint inventorship, the legal standard for best mode requires that all joint inventors reach an agreement or meeting of the minds that there is only a single best mode for practicing the invention and, thus, the discrepancy between the joint inventors’ subjective best modes should defeat Broetje’s motion as a matter of law. Id. Second, plaintiffs contended that a best mode violation requires “intentional” concealment of the best mode. Id.

The Court rejected both of plaintiffs’ legal arguments. Id. at 9-11. In rejecting plaintiffs’ first legal argument, the Court noted that the Federal Circuit, in Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1357, 1361-62, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2011), in affirming summary judgment of best mode invalidity wherein the patents-in-suit listed six inventors, repeatedly indicated that the best mode requirement was violated by the failure of a single inventor to disclose his or her contemplated best mode. Id. at 9-10. In rejecting plaintiffs’ second legal argument, the Court found that, “[a]lthough some Federal Circuit decisions do contain passing references to intentional concealment in connection with the best mode requirement, the clear weight of Federal Circuit authority holds that intentional concealment is not required for best mode violations.” Id. at 10-11 (internal citations omitted).
 

Judge Stark Denies Broetje's Motion to Dismiss Alleging Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Patent-in-Suit

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Ateliers De La Haute-Garonne, et al. v. Broetje Automation-USA Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 09-598-LPS (D.Del., October 13, 2011), the Court denied the motion of defendants Broetje Automation-USA, Inc. and Bröetje-Automation GMBH to dismiss plaintiffs’ first claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In their motion, defendants asserted that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over U.S. Patent No, 5,011,339 (“the ‘339 patent”) because the Applicants’ check to cover the issue fee bounced and, thus, the patent should be regarded as abandoned under 35 U.S.C. § 151 for failure to timely pay the required issue fee. Id. at 2. However, after considering the parties’ respective arguments and the evidence presented in the parties’ briefing and oral arguments, the Court concluded that plaintiffs established by a preponderance of the evidence that the issue fee was paid. Id. Thus, the ‘339 patent was not abandoned and the motion was denied.  Id. at 5.

A copy of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Magistrate Judge Burke Grants Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited Discovery

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Christopher J. Burke in Kone Corporation v. Thyssenkrupp USA, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 11-465-LPS-CJB (D.Del., September 26, 2011), the Court granted Plaintiff Kone Corporation’s motion for leave to take expedited discovery in connection with its pending motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court did modify and limit the scope of the expedited discovery granted. Id. at 16.

A copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

In evaluating the motion, the Court noted that it had to decide which standard to apply for evaluating requests for expedited and/or early discovery since the Third Circuit has not adopted a standard and district courts in the Third Circuit have applied two different standards when considering motions for expedited discovery. Id. at 6. Ultimately, the Court concluded that it should apply the reasonableness standard to a request for expedited discovery. Id. at 9.

Under the reasonableness standard, the Court must weigh the need for discovery at an early juncture in the litigation against the breadth of the discovery requests and the prejudice to the responding party by considering such factors as (1) the timing and context of the discovery requests, including whether a preliminary injunction hearing has been scheduled; (2) the scope and purpose of the discovery requests; and (3) the nature of the burden to respondent. Id. at 7. After evaluating Plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery under the reasonableness standard, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion but did alter the scope of the expedited discovery. Id. at 16.
 

Judge Stark Grants Softview's Motion to Strike Defendants Apple and AT&T Mobility's Inequitable Conduct Defenses

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Softview LLC v. Apple, Inc. and AT&T Mobility LLC, Civil Action No. 10-389-LPS (D.Del., September 30, 2011), the Court granted plaintiff Softview’s motion to strike the original and proposed amended inequitable conduct defenses of defendants Apple and AT&T Mobility because both the original and proposed amended pleadings containing the inequitable conduct defense failed to adequately allege scienter. The Court, citing to the Federal Circuit's Opinion in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) noted that an inequitable conduct pleading “must allege facts ‘giv[ing] rise to a reasonable inference of scienter, including both (1) knowledge of the withheld material information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) specific intent to deceive the PTO’).” Id. at 2.

Upon evaluation of defendants’ pleadings, the Court concluded that defendants’ theory of inequitable conduct is based on a “mere disagreement with Softview’s prosecution counsel on whether certain amendments impermissibly added new matter” and such disagreement does not give rise to a reasonable inference that Softview’s counsel knew he was amending to add new matter and intended to deceive the PTO of this fact. Id. Accordingly, the Court found that neither the original or proposed amended pleading sufficiently set forth the required scienter element of  inequitable conduct for an invalidity defense. Id. at 3.

A complete copy of the Court’s Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Judge Stark Refuses to Disrupt Jury's Verdict and Denies Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motions

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Laboratory Skin Care, Inc., et al. v. Limited Brands, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 06-601-LPS (D. Del., September 8, 2011), the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative for a New Trial.   In their motion, Plaintiffs raised three grounds for the relief they sought: (1) insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of a barring sale; (2) erroneous jury instructions on both elements of the on-sale bar test; and (3) the alleged admittance into evidence of expert testimony beyond the scope of the expert report. Id. at 2. In denying Plaintiffs’ motion and upholding the verdict, the Court found that the jury did have sufficient evidence on which to base its finding of a barring sale, the Court's instructions on the two elements of the on-sale bar test were proper, and the disputed expert testimony was not unduly prejudicial to Plaintiffs. Id. at 5-15.

A complete copy of the Court’s Opinion is attached.

Judge Robinson Denies Defendant's Motion to Amend Its Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims to Add New Allegations of Inequitable Conduct

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Ashai Glass Co., Ltd., et al. v. Guardian Industries Corp., Civil Action No. 09-515-SLR (D.Del., August 12, 2011), the Court denied the motion of defendant, Guardian Industries Corp., seeking to amend its affirmative defenses and counterclaims to assert new allegations of inequitable conduct against plaintiffs relating to concealing or misrepresenting the true inventorship of pending claims to the USPTO during the prosecution of the patents-in-suit.

A complete copy of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

By way of background, the Scheduling Order entered by the Court in March 2010 provided that amended pleadings were due by August 15, 2010. Id. at 1. Defendant did not file its motion to amend its affirmative defenses and counterclaims to add the new allegations of inequitable conduct until March 4, 2011. Id.

In denying defendant’s motion to amend, the Court recognized that “leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Id. at 3. However, the Court also recognized that “[t]he court may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend in situations in which the moving party has delayed seeking leave and the delay is ‘undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to the opposing party.’” Id. The Court noted that “[d]elay is ‘undue’ when an unwarranted burden is placed on the court or when the requesting party has had previous opportunities to amend.” Id. at 4.

After analyzing the particular facts with respect to defendant’s motion to amend, the Court determined that the critical documents to defendant’s new inequitable conduct allegations were publicly available prior to close of discovery, defendant’s delay in waiting to move to amend until March 4, 2011 was largely unexplained, and allowing defendant to amend at such a late stage would place an unwarranted burden on the Court and prejudice plaintiffs in several respects. Id. at 4-6. Thus, defendant’s motion to amend was denied. Id. at 6.
 

Chief Judge Sleet Rules That Plaintiffs' '932 Patent Is Not Invalid for Obviousness-Type Double Patenting

By Memorandum Opinion entered by Chief Judge Gregory M. Sleet, following a five-day bench trial, in Eli Lilly and Company, et al. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 08-335-GMS (D.Del., July 28, 2011), the Court set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Eli Lilly and Company and The Trustees of Princeton University, and against defendants, Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., APP Pharmaceuticals, LLC and Barr Laboratories, Inc. In doing so, the Court rejected defendants’ contentions and concluded that U.S. Patent No. 5,344,932 (“the ‘932 patent”) is not invalid for obviousness-type double patenting. Id. at 2-8. After considering the entire record in the case and the applicable law, the Court determined that the credibility of plaintiffs’ witnesses substantially outweighed the evidence presented by defendants, and defendants failed to prove the invalidity by obviousness-type double patenting of the ‘932 patent. Id. at 2-9.

A complete copy of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

Judge Stark Grants Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue to Central District of California

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Human Genome Sciences, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 11-082-LPS (D.Del., July 18, 2011), the Court granted the motion of defendants, Genetech, Inc. and City of Hope, to transfer venue of three actions filed against them in the District of Delaware by plaintiff, Human Genome Sciences, Inc. (“HGS”), to the Central District of California. Id. at 1. The transferred actions involve claims asserted by HGS against defendants for declaratory judgment, antitrust and Lanham Act violations, and state tort claims based on two patents co-owned by defendants: U.S. Patent No. 6, 331,415 (the “Cabilly II patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 7,923,221 (the “Cabilly III patent”). Id.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

In granting defendants’ motion to transfer venue, the Court recognized that defendants had a heavy burden to meet: “unless the burden of convenience of the parties is strongly in favor of defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should prevail.” Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted). However, the Court also recognized that the Cabilly II patent has been involved in numerous other cases in the Central District of California and that “[a] motion to transfer may also be granted if there is a related case which has been first filed or otherwise is the more appropriate vehicle to litigate the issues between the parties.” Id. at 2 and 5.

Thus, after analyzing all of the applicable factors, the Court noted that “the analysis here turns on a balance between the weight due to HGS’s choice of forum and the practical consideration of Judge Pfaelzer’s experience with the Cabilly II patent and willingness to preside over these litigations.” Id. at 21. The Court concluded that, under the circumstances present, the latter factor should be accorded “heavy, indeed decisive, weight.” Id. Accordingly, the Court granted defendants’ motion to transfer venue.
 

Judge Robinson Allows Eon's Direct Infringement Claims to Proceed, But Dismisses Its Joint And Indirect Infringement Claims

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Sue L. Robinson in EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. FLO TV Inc., et al., Civil Action Action No. 10-812-SLR (D.Del., July 12, 2011), the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint of plaintiff Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC. (“EON”). In its second amended complaint, EON asserted claims against defendants FLO TV Inc. (“FLO TV”), MobiTV, Inc. (“MobiTV”), U.S. Cellular Corp. (“U.S. Cellular”), LG Electronics MobileComm USA, Inc. (“LG”), Motorola Mobility (“Motorola”), Samsung Telecommunications America LLC (“Samsung”), Sprint Nextel Corp. (“Sprint”), Research in Motion Corp (“RIM”), HTC America Inc. (“HTC”), Palm, Inc. (“Palm”),. Kyocera Communications Inc. (“Kyocera”), LetsTalk.com, Inc. (“LetsTalk.com”), Qualcomm, Inc. (“Qualcomm”), GoTV Networks, Inc. (“GoTV”), Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless (“Verizon Wireless”), SPB Software, Inc. (“SPB”) and Simplexity, LLC d/b/a Wirefly (“Wirefly”) (collectively, “defendants”) seeking damages and injunctive relief for defendants’ alleged direct, indirect, and joint infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,663,757, entitled “Software Controlled Multi-Mode Interactive TV Systems” (the ‘757 patent). In denying defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the direct infringement claims, the Court found that EON’s second amended complaint satisfied the minimal requirements for pleading direct infringement without the benefits of discovery. See id. at 5. In granting defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the joint and indirect infringement claims, the Court found the EON’s second amended complaint failed to adequately set forth the requisite knowledge element for indirect infringement and failed to identify any one defendant as exercising “control or direction” over the allegedly infringing acts of the other defendants (in other words, failed to identify a single mastermind) necessary to set forth a claim for joint infringement. See id. at 9-12.

A complete copy of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

Chief Judge Sleet Concludes that Mylan's Proposed ANDA Product Does Not Infringe the Patent-In-Suit Asserted by AstraZeneca and Others

By Memorandum Opinion entered by the Honorable Gregory M. Sleet in AstraZeneca LP, et al. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Civil Action No. 08-53-GMS (D.Del., June 23, 2011) after a three day bench trial, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Mylan’s proposed generic budesonide product would infringe the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,643,602 (the “‘602 patent” or the “patent-in-suit”).

A complete copy of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

Chief Judge Sleet Denies Nokia's Motion to Stay Pending Reexamination of Apple's Patents by USPTO

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet in Nokia Corporation v. Apple Inc., Civil Action No. 09-791-GMS (D.Del., June 1, 2011), the Court denied plaintiff/counterclaim-defendant Nokia’s motion to stay defendant/counterclaim-plaintiff Apple’s patent infringement claims pending reexamination of Apple’s patents by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). In doing so, the Court noted that the decision to stay a case is firmly within the discretion of the court and that authority is the same in patent cases where a reexamination by the USPTO has been requested. Id. at 2.

The Court also noted that, in determining whether a stay is appropriate, its discretion should be guided by the following factors: “(1) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set.” Id. After analyzing these factors, the Court concluded that a stay pending reexamination would not serve the interests of judicial efficiency in this matter given the stage of the litigation and granting the stay would not simplify the case because the majority of the case would proceed regardless of whether Apple’s claims were stayed. Id. at 3.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

Judge Robinson Grants Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Mylan from Manufacturing, Using, Offering to Sell, or Selling Generic Drug

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in In Re: Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation, Civil Action No. 09-MD-2118-SLR (D.Del., May 20, 2011), the Court granted plaintiffs Eurand, Inc. and Anesta AG’s motion for temporary restraining order and enjoined defendants Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Mylan, Inc. (collectively, “Mylan”) from manufacturing, using, offering to sell, or selling generic extended release cyclobenzaprine products.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

Judge Stark Denies Holding Company's Motion To Dismiss Patent Infringement Complaint

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Tarkus Imaging, Inc. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 10-63-LPS (D.Del., April 21, 2011), the Court denied the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Nikon Americas, Inc. (“NA”) which contended that, as a holding company, it does not – and cannot – infringe the patent-in-suit. The Court disagreed and, thus, denied NA’s motion. Id. at 5.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached hereto.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Motion to Stay Filed by Defendant Cordis Corporation

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Boston Scientific Corporation, et al. v. Cordis Corporation, Civil Action No. 10-315-SLR, the Court denied the motion to stay filed by Defendant Cordis Corporation (“Cordis”) seeking to stay the trial scheduled to begin on May 5, 2011. In denying the motion to stay, the Court noted that motions to stay are subject to the Court's broad discretionary powers and the following three factors guide the Court in evaluating whether to grant a motion to stay: (1) whether the granting of a stay would cause the non-moving party to suffer undue prejudice from any delay or allow the moving party to gain a clear tactical advantage over the non-moving party; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues for trial; and (3) whether discovery is complete and a trial date set. Id. at 7. After evaluating and balancing the foregoing factors, the Court concluded that granting the motion to stay was not warranted under the circumstances. Id. at 7 and 10.

A complete copy of the Court’s Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Grants Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Claim of Indirect Infringement

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Minkus Electronic Display Systems, Inc. v. Adaptive Micro Systems LLC, Civil Action No. 10-666-SLR (D.Del., March 16, 2011), the Court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for indirect infringement. Id. at 7. In their motions, defendants argued that plaintiff failed to alleged sufficient facts to establish that: (1) a third party infringed the patent-in-suit prior to the filing of the first amended complaint as a result of any acts by defendants; (2) any specific product that is not capable of a substantial non-infringing use was sold by defendants prior to the filing of the first amended complaint; and (3) defendants possessed the requisite knowledge and intent to indirectly infringe the patent-in-suit at the time of the alleged infringement. Id. at 4. After analyzing defendants’ contentions, the Court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that would allow the court to infer that defendants had any knowledge of the patent-in-suit at the time there were committing the allegedly infringing activities. Id. at 6-7. Rather, the first amended complaint simply contained a mere recitation of the elements of indirect infringement, which the Court found insufficient. Id. at 7.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached hereto.
 

Court Appoints Merit Selection Panel to Assist with Selection Process for Vacant U.S. Magistrate Judge Position

Gregory B. Williams, a partner in the Wilmington office of Fox Rothschild LLP, has been appointed by the Judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware to serve as Chair of the U.S. Magistrate Judge Merit Selection Panel. In addition to Mr. Williams, the Court appointed ten other members to serve on the eleven member Panel, including Regina Kerr Alonzo, Dace J. Blaskovitz, Scott E. Chambers, Esquire, Moira K. Donoghue, Esquire, Tara D. Elliott, Esquire, Ann Shea Gaza, Esquire, Kathleen M. Jennings, Esquire, Dr. David P. Roselle, Robert S. Saunders, Esquire and William J. Wade, Esquire. The Panel will investigate and interview applicants for the vacant U.S. Magistrate Judge position created after the Honorable Leonard P. Stark was elevated from U.S. Magistrate Judge to District Judge. The Panel will prepare a report with its recommendations and submit the report to the Judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware for consideration and selection.  A copy of the Standing Order appointing the Panel, which can also be found on the Court's website, is attached.
 

Judge Stark Grants Prevailing Plaintiff's Request For Enhanced Damages In Part And Denies Request For Award Of Attorneys' Fees

By Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 04-1371-LPS (D.Del., January 18, 2011), the Court granted in part and denied in part the post-trial motion of the prevailing Plaintiff, Power Integrations, Inc. (“Power”), to declare the case exceptional and to award Power treble damages and its attorneys’ fees. Specifically, the Court granted Power’s motion for enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 to the extent that it enhanced Power’s damages two times (i.e. 200%) as opposed to trebling damages. Id. at 22. The Court denied Power’s motion to declare the case exceptional and to award attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Id. at 24.

Complete copies of the Court’s Opinion and Order are attached.
 

By way of background, in October 2004, Power filed suit against Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc. and Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation (collectively, “Fairchild”) alleging that Fairchild infringed certain of Fairchild’s patents. After discovery was completed and the Court issued its claim construction opinion, the case proceeded to trial in four phases: (1) a jury trial was held on the issues of infringement and willfulness; (2) a second jury issued a verdict on invalidity; (3) a bench trial was held on Fairchild’s inequitable conduct defense; and (4) a second bench trial was held on the issue of willfulness in light of the intervening decision by the Federal Circuit in In Re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Significantly, each phase of the litigation went against Fairchild, including the second bench trial on willfulness during which the Court upheld the jury’s previous finding that Fairchild willfully infringed Power’s patents. Id. at 1-2.

In analyzing Power’s motion requesting the Court to declare the case exceptional and to award enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees, the Court recognized that its power to award enhanced damages and, in exceptional cases, attorneys’ fees is derived from statute – specifically from 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285. Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, the “[C]ourt may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the “[C]ourt in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”

The Court noted that a § 284 inquiry has two steps. “First, a determination is made as to whether the infringer acted with culpability. A finding of willful infringement satisfies this culpability requirement. Second, the Court must determine whether, given the totality of the circumstances, damages should be enhanced.” Id. at 12.

With respect to the first step of the § 284 inquiry, the Court determined that it was satisfied because Fairchild had already been found to have willfully infringed Power’s patents. Id. Thus, the Court determined that it needed to analyze and determine whether, given the totality of the circumstances, damages should be enhanced and, to do so, it needed to evaluate the “Read factors”. Id. The Read factors are: (1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another; (2) whether the infringer investigated the scope of the patent and had a good faith belief that it was not infringing or that the patent was invalid; (3) the infringer’s behavior during litigation; (4) the infringer’s size and financial condition; (5) any remedial actions taken; (6) the closeness of the case; (7) the duration of the infringing conduct; and (8) any concealment on the part of the infringer. Id. at 12-13. The Court noted that “[n]o one factor is dispositive.” Rather, the paramount determination in deciding whether to grant enhanced damages and the amount thereof is the egregiousness of the infringer’s conduct based on all of the facts and circumstances. Id. at 13.

After analyzing the Read factors and taking into consideration both jury verdicts against Fairchild, the Court’s unequivocal willfulness opinion, the parties submissions and the rationale underlying enhanced damages, the Court concluded that Fairchild’s conduct was sufficiently culpable to justify enhancing damages and that enhanced damages were appropriate in this action. Id. at 22. However, the Court was not convinced that the circumstances of the case were sufficiently egregious to justify a full trebling of damages and, thus, decided to double the damages awarded instead of tripling the damages. Id.

With respect to Power’s motion for attorneys’ fees, the Court noted that, “[i]n undertaking a § 285 inquiry, the Court focuses in particular on the actual conduct of the parties during the course of litigating or prosecuting the patent.” Id. at 23. Moreover, the Court noted that the “Federal Circuit has made it clear that attorneys’ fees should be awarded only in ‘limited circumstances’ and are not to become an ‘ordinary thing in patent litigation.’” Id. After analyzing Fairchild’s conduct during the litigation, the Court determined that it would not declare this case exceptional under § 285 and refused to award attorneys’ fees. Thus, Power’s motion was denied to the extent it sought to declare the case exceptional and recover its attorneys’ fees. Id. at 24.
 

Judge Robinson Grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of NonInfringement

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Autocell Laboratories, Inc. v. Cisco Systems Inc., Civil Action No. 08-760 (D.Del., January 5, 2011), the Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity of the patent in dispute, and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment of infringement. After comparing the defendant’s accused products to the construed claims at issue, claims 1 of 2 of U.S. Patent No. 7,369,858 (“the ‘858 patent”), the Court found that defendants’ products do not infringe the asserted claims of the ‘858 patent as a matter of law.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

Judge Stark Denies Defendants' Motion to Stay Patent Infringement Action Pending Resolution of Reexamination Proceeding Before USPTO

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Cooper Notification, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 09-865-LPS (D.Del., December 13, 2010), the Court denied the motion of defendants, Twitter, Inc., Everbridge, Inc., Rave Wireless, Inc. and Federal Signal Corp., to stay the patent infringement action pending resolution of the inter partes reexamination proceeding that defendants initiated in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) concerning the patent at issue based on four prior art references.

In denying the motion, the Court recognized that the decision of whether or not to stay litigation pending a USPTO reexamination proceeding is a matter left to the Court’s discretion. Id. at 2. Typically, in deciding how to exercise its discretion of whether to grant a stay of litigation, the Court noted that it considers three factors: (1) whether a stay will simplify the issues and trial of the case; (2) whether discovery is complete and a trial date has been set; and (3) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party. Id. at 2-3. Moreover, the Court noted that “a showing of hardship or inequity is ‘generally’ needed to show that the balance of equities favors a stay,” although it is not an absolute requirement. Id. at 4 (citing Court’s prior decision in St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. Fujifilm Holding Corp., 2009 WL 192457 (D.Del., January 27, 2009)).

Ultimately, after evaluating the factors, the Court concluded that a stay of the litigation in this action was not appropriate because, among other reasons, granting a stay would unduly prejudice plaintiff and provide defendants a clear, and unwarranted, tactical advantage. Id. at 5-9. Accordingly, the Court denied defendants’ motion to stay. Id. at 9.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Acceleron's Motion to Complete Rule 56(f) Discovery

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson in Acceleron, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co. and Intel Corp., C.A. No. 10-128-SLR (D.Del., December 16, 2010), the Court denied the motion of plaintiff Acceleron, LLC (“Acceleron”) seeking to complete discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Id. at 7. In denying the motion, the Court concluded that additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) was not justified “because Acceleron failed to diligently pursue the discovery necessary to prove the elements of the claims asserted in its complaint during the fact discovery period.” Id. at 5.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

By way of background, Acceleron initially filed the action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas claiming infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,948,021 (“the ‘021 patent”) against Hewlett-Packard and Intel. Hewlett Packard and Intel’s answers and counterclaims to Acceleron’s complaint included defenses and counterclaims of non-infringement and invalidity. Id. at 1. Discovery began in the case in March 2009 when a discovery order was entered by the Eastern District of Texas and, in July 2009, defendants produced a substantial amount of discovery in response to Acceleron’s discovery requests. Id. In February 2010, after the case was transferred to the District of Delaware, Acceleron served additional discovery requests on defendants, including requests for information regarding sales, customer communications and other customer data. By early April 2010, defendants objected to those discovery requests served by Acceleron on grounds that the requests related to damages and were irrelevant during the liability phase of the bifurcated proceeding. Id. at 1-2.

On April 23, 2010, the Court held a discovery conference to determine how to narrow the scope of Acceleron’s additional discovery requests. Following the discovery conference, Acceleron narrowed those discovery requests. Id. at 3. During a follow-up hearing on May 3, 2010, counsel for Acceleron informed the Court that all but one outstanding discovery issue with defendants (which was unrelated to the dispute at issue in this opinion) had been resolved. Id.

On the last of fact discovery, Hewlett-Packard produced seven Excel documents containing raw configuration data from its configuration to order system showing the system configurations purchased by customers. Thereafter, in October 2010, defendants submitted their expert reports, which considered the configuration data of the accused products and concluded that not all of the accused systems were sold with components required by Acceleron’s claim construction. Id. Subsequently, defendants filed their motions for summary judgment of non-infringement. Id.

In response to defendants’ motions for summary judgment of non-infringement, Acceleron moved to complete Rule 56(f) discovery and to compel additional discovery concerning customer data, contending that defendants prevented Acceleron from obtaining discovery regarding customer configurations of the accused products. Id. Under Rule 56(f), if a party opposing a motion for summary judgment “shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other just order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).

In response to Acceleron’s motion, defendants contended that Acceleron was not entitled to Rule 56(f) discovery because, among other things, (1) Acceleron failed to seek the requested information during the fact discovery period, (2) a significant number of marketing and sales documents were produced to Acceleron during discovery and defendants believed that all discovery objections had been resolved, (3) most of the information sought by Acceleron through its Rule 56(f) discovery request was possessed by third party customers and distributors, and (4) the information sought by Acceleron was irrelevant to, at least, Hewlett-Packard’s non-infringement claims because they do not rely on customer data. Id. at 5.

In analyzing Acceleron’s motion and concluding that additional discovery under Rule 56(f) was not justified, the Court noted that Acceleron’s complaint set forth claims for inducement of infringement and contributory infringement. The Court emphasized that, as the patent owner, Acceleron, bore the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 5-6. The Court found that, it is well established, that “inducement of infringement requires proof ‘that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.’” The Court also found that contributory infringement requires “proof of defendant’s knowledge that the combination for which the components were especially made was both patented and infringing, and that defendant’s components have no substantial non-infringing uses.” Id. at 6.

Ultimately, the Court was not persuaded that Acceleron was unaware of its burden to prove infringing customer configurations until defendants filed their motions for summary judgment on non-infringement and, thus, concluded that Acceleron failed to diligently pursue the discovery necessary to prove the elements of its claim during the discovery period. Id. at 5-7. Accordingly, the Court refused to reopen fact discovery.
 

Judge Robinson Denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson on November 9, 2010, the Court denied the Skype defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Upon analyzing the amended complaint, the Court found that the amended complaint “contains sufficient factual matter, under Igbal, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 6. The Court noted that, “[w]hile the amended complaint is neither succinct nor representative of artful drafting, the court concludes that plaintiffs have now met the minimum requirements under Rule 8.” Id.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

In its analysis, the Court also noted that the Twombly pleading standard is met by the sample complaint for patent infringement set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Form 18 (2006). In other words, only the following is required: (1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff owns the patent; (3) a statement that defendant has been infringing the patent by making, selling, and using [the device] embodying the patent; (4) a statement that the plaintiff has given the defendant notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an injunction and damages. Id. at 4 (quoting McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Court ultimately concluded that the amended complaint in this action met all of the foregoing requirements. Id. at 4-6.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court refused to consider an affidavit that defendants’ submitted with their brief stating that the Skype voicemail server farms are located only in Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands. The Court found that the affidavit does not fall within the narrow category of documents properly considered in evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 6-7. The Court also refused to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment in order to consider defendants’ affidavit because there had been no opportunity for reasonable opportunity for discovery by either party. Id.
 

Judge Thynge Recommends Denial of Xoft's Motion to Transfer Case from Delaware

By Report and Recommendation entered on October 13, 2010, The Honorable Mary Pat Thynge, in Carl Zeiss Meditec, Inc., et al. v. Xoft, Inc., C.A. No. 10-308-LPS-MPT, analyzed the motion of defendant Xoft, Inc. ("Xoft") to transfer the case from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and recommended that Xoft's motion be denied.  A copy of the Report and Recommendation is attached.

In analyzing Xoft’s motion, the Court recognized that it has the authority to transfer the action to the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at 2. The Court noted, however, that (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be lightly disturbed; (2) the plaintiff’s chosen forum is a paramount consideration even where the forum is not the plaintiff’s “home turf” or where the alleged wrongful conduct occurred; (3) the moving party has the burden to establish that the transferee forum is proper and that the balancing of the relevant private and public interests weighs heavily in favor of transfer; and (4) transfer should be denied if the parties’ interests, as applied, are evenly balanced or only slightly favor transfer. Id.

The Court set forth the relevant private and public interests that must be weighed in determining whether a motion to transfer should be granted. Id. at 3. The Court noted that the relevant private interests include: (1) plaintiff’s forum preference; (2) defendant’s forum preference; (3) whether the claims arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) convenience of witnesses to the extent that they may be unavailable for trial in a certain forum, and; (6) the location of sources of proof to the extent production may be unavailable in a certain forum. Id. at 3-4. The Court noted that the relevant public interests include: (1) the enforceability of the judgment; (2) practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (3) administrative difficulties in each forum resulting from court congestion; (4) local interest in deciding the dispute; and (5) public policies of the forum. Id. at 4.

After weighing the private and public interest factors, the Court concluded that such factors do not weigh in favor of transfer or only weigh slightly in favor of transfer in this action. Id. at 4-9. Thus, the Court found that Xoft failed to carry its burden of proving that the private and public interest factors strongly favor transfer. Id. at 9.
 

Chief Judge Sleet Finds Two Of The Asserted Claims Of Plaintiffs' Patent-In-Suit Are Invalid Due To Indefiniteness

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet in the consolidated patent infringement action, Aventis Pharma S.A., et al. v. Hospira, Inc., C.A. No 07-721-GMS and Aventis Pharma S.A., et al. v. Apotex, Inc., C.A. No. 08-496-GMS (D.Del., September 27, 2010), the Court concluded, among other things, that (1) claims 2 and 10 of the ‘561 patent are invalid due to indefiniteness; (2) all asserted claims of the patents-in-suit are invalid due to obviousness; and (3) the asserted claims are unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Id. at 2. The Court made its ruling following a seven day bench trial and post-trial submissions by the parties.

A complete copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.
 

A patent claim satisfies the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 if a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Paragraph 2 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the specification conclude with one or more claims “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” Id. Significantly, “[a] claim is considered indefinite if it does not reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of its scope.” Id. at 20 (quoting Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

With respect to its conclusion that claims 2 and 10 of the ‘561 patent are invalid due to indefiniteness, the Court agreed with defendants, Hospira and Apotex, that claims 2 and 10 of the ‘561 patent are indefinite because they impermissibly mix two categories of patentable subject matter. Id. at 20. Specifically, defendants asserted that claims 2 and 10 of the ‘561 patent, both of which are composition claims, “impermissibly include a process limitation: ‘whereby said composition is used to form’ (claim 2), and ‘whereby said therapeutic composition forms or is used to form’ (claim 10). Id. at 20.

After analyzing the claims at issue and the Federal Circuit’s holdings in IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (when a claim impermissibly mixes two or more classes of patentable subject matter, the claim is indefinite) and Microprocessor Enhancement Corp., 520 F.3d at 1375 (clarifying scope of IPXL Holdings opinion), the Court found that claims 2 and 10 of the ‘561 patent “fall squarely within the category of indefinite claims discussed in IPXL Holdings, even as that holding was limited by Microprocessor Enhancement Corp.Id. at 23. The Court followed the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in IPXL Holdings that noted, “when two separate statutory classes of invention are impermissibly mixed, a manufacturer or seller of the claim apparatus would not know from the claim whether it might also be liable for contributory infringement because a buyer or user of the apparatus later performs the claimed method of using the apparatus.” Id. at 23 (citing IPXL Holdings, 430 F.3d at 1384. The Court concluded that same reasoning applied to claims 2 and 10 of the ‘561 patent, because they are mixed subject matter claims and it is not clear from those claims when they would be infringed. Id. at 22.
 

Court Denies Defendants' Request to Preclude Plaintiff's Trial Counsel Exposed to Defendants' Confidential Information from Participating in Patent Reexamination

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Mary Pat Thynge in Xerox Corporation v. Google, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 10-136-JJF-MPT (D.Del., September 8, 2010), the Court concluded that defendants failed to show good cause to preclude plaintiff’s trial counsel in the patent infringement action that were exposed to defendants’ confidential information from participating in amendment of plaintiff’s patents during reexamination proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).

A complete copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
 

In its reasoning, the Court noted that, although the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) dealt only with provisions limiting participation in patent prosecution, its logic was applicable in the context of patent reexamination as well. In other words, “just as in patent prosecution, the primary factor affecting the risk of inadvertent disclosure during reexamination is the extent to which counsel are involved in competitive decision making with the client." Id. at 3. The Court cautioned, however, that even where risk of inadvertent disclosure or competitive use exists, the Court must balance that risk against the potential harm to the opposing party in denying it its counsel of choice. Id.

After balancing the risks, the Court found that the risk of inadvertent disclosure or competitive use of defendants’ confidential information by plaintiff’s trial counsel in evaluating potential claim amendments during the reexamination proceedings was outweighed by the potential harm to plaintiff if it was prevented from the full participation of its trial counsel during the reexamination proceedings. Id. at 7. The Court noted, among other things, that, “because reexamination (especially inter partes reexamination) is an increasingly important venue for challenging a patent’s validity, preventing trial counsel exposed to defendants’ confidential information from fully participating in reexamination proceedings would force plaintiff to split its resources between two fronts of the same war.” Id. at 6.
 

Judge Stark Elevated to District Court Judge

The U.S. Senate confirmed the Honorable Leonard P. Stark as a district court judge on the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  The confirmation elevates Judge Stark from a magistrate judge to a district court judge.  Given the retirement of the Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. last week, the Court still has one vacant district court judge position left to be filled.  The Court will now need to find someone to replace Judge Stark as a magistrate judge.

Judge Robinson Grants Cisco Systems' Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement

On July 26, 2010, through an Opinion and Order entered by the Honorable Sue L. Robinson, the District of Delaware ruled on ten motions in the two related patent infringement actions captioned, Sigram Schindler Betieligungsgesellschaft mbH v. Cisco Systems, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-72-SLR, and Cisco Systems v. Sigram Schindler Betieligungsgesellschaft mbH, Civil Action No. 09-232-SLR. The patents in suit relate to voice over internet protocol telephony. The problem claimed to be solved by the invention is how to use internet telephony without interrupting the real-time transfer of data. Id. at 16.

In light of the breadth and length of the Opinion, which is fifty-seven (57) pages, this posting focuses only on the Court’s ruling with respect to the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. In that regard, Sigram Schindler Betieligungsgesellschaft (“SSBG”) sought partial summary judgment that Cisco’s 1861, 881 SRST and 888 SRST router products infringe claim 34 of U.S. Patent No. 6,954,453 (“the ‘453 patent”), claim 45 of U.S. Patent No. 7,483,431 (“the ‘431 patent”) and claims 69 and 84 of U.S. Patent No. 7,145,902 (“the ‘902 patent”). Cisco sought summary judgment that its router products did not infringe the patents under any of the fourteen infringing scenarios identified by SSBG’s expert in his infringement report. Id. at 13. In short, the Court granted Cisco’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement, and denied SSBG’s motion for summary judgment of infringement. Id. at 30-31. A complete copy of the Opinion is attached.
 

Significantly, the Court, by and through Judge Robinson, had also issued its Claim Construction Opinion on the same date construing certain claim limitations relevant to the issue of infringement. A copy of the Claim Construction Opinion is attached.

After analyzing SSBG’s motion for partial summary judgment of infringement and Cisco’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement and relying upon its claim constructions, the Court granted Cisco’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement, and denied SSBG’s motion for partial summary judgment of infringement. Id. at 31. In so ruling, the Court found that all of SSBG’s relevant infringing scenarios, except “call transfer”, were premised on SSBG’s construction of the term “change over”, which the Court rejected in accepting Cisco’s construction of that term. Id. at 18-30. With respect to the “call transfer” scenario, the Court found could that SSBG had not identified a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 22-24. With respect to those asserted claims requiring “means responsive to a control signal for changing over,” the Court noted that its holding was bolstered in that there was no dispute that Cisco’s products do not contain the “control device” structure described in the specification of the patent. Further, the Court found that no reasonable jury could find that Cisco infringes the ‘431 patent for the additional reason that there was no indication in the record that Cisco directly infringes that patent. Id. at 30.
 

Judge Farnan Issues Willfulness and Damages Opinion in LGD v. AUO

On July 8, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, by and through a Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., issued its conclusions on the issues of willful infringement and damages in LG Display Co., Ltd. v. AU Optronics Corp., et al., Civil Action No. 06-726-JJF (consolidated).  With respect to willfulness, the Court concluded that AUO did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that LGD willfully infringed the asserted AUO patents that the Court had ruled in its prior Opinion (See Blog Posting of June 5, 2010) were infringed by LGD.  In reaching its conclusion on willfulness, the Court found that AUO presented very little evidence of LGD's prelitigation conduct and that LGD maintained plausible and credible defenses to infringement and plausible and credible arguments concerning invalidity of the asserted patents.  Id. at 1-4.

With respect to damages for LGD's infringement of the asserted AUO patents, the Court concluded that AUO is entitled to damages in the lump sum amount of $305,399, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest.  Id. at 6-14.  The damages award was on the lower end of the damages range that AUO contended it was entitled to as a result of LGD's infringement.  Id. at 6.   Given there was no finding of willful infringement by LGD and no other evidence presented by AUO sufficient for the Court to declare the case "exceptional" to justify an enhanced damages award, the Court declined to award AUO its attorneys' fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.  Id. at 11-13.

A copy of the complete Opinion is attached.

Judge Kelly Denies Motion to Stay Defendants' Patent Counterclaims Pending Re-examination of Patents At Issue By USPTO

In Life Technologies Corporation, et al. v. Illumina, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 09-706-RK (D.Del., June 7, 2010), the Court , by opinion entered by Senior Judge Robert F. Kelly, denied plaintiff Life Tech's motion to stay defendants' patent counterclaims pending re-examination of defendants' patents-in-suit by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").  In support of their motion, plaintiffs asserted that the re-examinations by the USPTO would likely to result in cancellation or changes of the asserted patent claims, that a stay would streamline issues in the action and promote judicial economy, and proceeding with Life Tech's invalidity case against defendant Illumina's patents in this action could be contradictory to the result of the re-examination of those patents by the USPTO.  Id. at 2-4.  Defendants countered by asserting that the delay in the re-examination process will be much longer than plaintiff suggests, the subject matter underlying plaintiffs and defendants infringement and invalidity claims are related, plaintiffs and defendants are direct competitors in the technology, and that it would be highly unlikely that proceeding in this action could produce a contradictory result in the re-examination proceeding before the USPTO because of the mandates of 35 U.S.C. § 317(b).  Id.

In denying plaintiffs' motion to stay, the Court reasoned that, although the re-examinations before the USPTO have the potential for simplifying the issues pertaining to the counterclaim patents in the case, the potential benefit would be at the expense of placing the counterclaim on hold for years while the plaintiffs' case continues.  Id. at 5.  Also, the patents in plaintiffs' case and the patents in defendants' counterclaim overlap at least to a certain extent and ,when one further considers that the claims at issue involve parties who are in direct competition, the potential for irreparable harm caused by a stay of the counterclaim far outweighs the possibility of simplifying some of the claims at issue.  Id. at 5-6.  Further, it is highly unlikely that a contradictory result could be reached in this Court and the USPTO in its re-examination proceeding because 35 U.S.C. § 317(b), which is applicable to inter-partes re-examinations, mandates that, if the Court proceeds in this action and Life Tech fails to prove that Illumina's patent claims are invalid, that result would be binding in the re-examinations.  Id. at 4.  Thus, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion to stay the counterclaim action.

A complete copy of the opinion is attached. 

Judge Farnan Issues Second Phase Opinion in LGD v. AUO

On April 30, 2010, The Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. issued the opinion setting forth the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in the second phase of the patent infringement action captioned LG Display Co., Ltd. v. AU Optronics Corp., C.A. No. 06-726-JJF (D.Del.).  In the second phase, the claims at issue were those asserted by LG Display Co., Ltd. ("LGD") alleging infringement of four patents against AU Optronics Corporation ("AUO") as well as AUO's invalidity defense.  In its latest opinion, the Court defined the disputed terms in the asserted patents and concluded that LGD did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that AUO infringes the asserted patents.  The Court also concluded that AUO did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted patents are invalid.

Readers may recall that, in February 2010, Judge Farnan issued the opinion setting forth the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in the first phase of this patent infringement action which addressed AUO's patent infringement claims against LGD and LGD's invalidity defense.  See Blog Posting of February 21, 2010.  In the first phase opinion, the Court concluded that AUO did establish by a preponderance of the evidence that LGD infringed the patents asserted by AUO in this action, and LGD did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that such patents were invalid.

Thus, the Court ruled in favor of AUO in both phases of the action following the bench trial that took place in June 2009.  A complete copy of the second phase opinion is attached. 

Judge Robinson Defers Ruling On Process Patent Until After Bilski Decision By U.S. Supreme Court

In an opinion entered by The Honorable Sue L. Robinson on February 26, 2010 in Accenture Global Services GMBH v. Guidewire Software Inc., Civil Action No. 07-826-SLR, the Court denied without prejudice defendant Guidewire Software Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment asserting the invalidity of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,013,284 ("the '284 patent") and 7,017,111 ("the '111 patent") claiming unpatentable subject matter and ordered that it be re-filed after the U.S. Supreme Court issues its ruling in Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. 2009).

In their complaint, plaintiffs assert that Guidewire infringes the '284 patent and '111 patent.  The patents at issue describe a computer program for developing component-based software capable of performing tasks relating to insurance transactions such as claim processing.  Guidewire's motion for partial summary judgment of the invalidity of the '284 and '111 patents for claiming unpatentable subject matter is based on the machine-or-transformation test ("MORT test") set forth by the Federal Circuit in In Re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).

The Bilski court explained that "a process is 'surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing."  Id. at 954.  However, in its opinion, the District of Delaware noted that the "Bilski court did not provide guidance as to the machine prong of the MORT test, stating that it would 'leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine.'"

The District Court also noted that it believes "the claims of plaintiffs' patents would not meet the 'transformation' prong of the MORT test, but raise substantial questions under the 'machine' prong."  The Court further noted that, while the plaintiffs' patents recite some machine connection, it is unclear whether the degree of connectivity meaningfully limits the claimed scope.  Thus, given the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court may illuminate or alter the framework of the determination under the MORT test, the Court found it prudent to defer the subject matter inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 until a decision is issued in Bilksi v. Doll

JUDGE ROBINSON GRANTS SKYPE'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' PATENT INFRINGEMENT COMPLAINT

In a ruling entered on February 24, 2010 in Eidos Communications, LLC v. Skype Technologies SA, Civil Action No. 09-234 (D.Del.), The Honorable Sue L. Robinson granted the motion of defendants, Skype Technologies, SA and Skype, Inc. ("Skype"), to dismiss plaintiffs' patent infringement complaint for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, motion for a more definite statement.  After analyzing the complaint, the Court concluded that plaintiffs' complaint failed failed to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Twombly.  This case is informative on the minimum requirements necessary by plaintiffs in identifying products or methodologies in their patent infringement complaints.

In their complaint, plaintiffs' alleged that (1) Skype produce, offer for sale, sell and/or import "communication systems products and/or methodologies that infringe one or more claims" of each of plaintiffs' patents; and (2) Skype's "communication system products and/or methodologies" meet each and every limitation of at least one claim of each patent. However, no specific products or methodologies were named in the complaint.

In granting Skype's motion, the Court found that plaintiffs' complaint in this action failed to even provide a general product category even analogous to "electric motors." The Court also found that plaintiffs' complaint failed to mimic Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Form 18, which sets forth a sample complaint for patent infringement that meets the Twombly pleading standard, insofar as no category of product or general identification of process or method is identified.

 

JUDGE FARNAN RULES THAT LG LITERALLY INFRINGES PATENTS OF AU OPTRONICS

In a Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. on February 16, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the patent infringement claims of AU Optronics Corporation (“AUO”) against LG Display Co., Ltd. (“LGD”) which were tried by the parties during phase one of the bench trial held before Judge Farnan in June 2009.  The Opinion also sets forth the Court’s claim construction of the disputed terms in the asserted patents and its analysis concerning the infringement claims asserted by AUO against LG, and the invalidity defense asserted by LG.

Ultimately, the Court concludes that (1) AUO established by a preponderance of the evidence that LGD literally infringes the patents asserted by AUO in the action, and (2) LGD did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the patents asserted by AUO in the action are invalid.  A complete copy of the Opinion is attached.

JUDGE STARK ANALYZES AND ISSUES HIS RECOMMENDATION ON PARTY'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISMISS CONSISTENT WITH EXERGEN

In Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 118383, Magistrate Judge Stark analyzed defendant Fairchild’s motion to strike and dismiss certain counterclaims and affirmative defenses of inequitable conduct and/or patent misuse asserted by plaintiff Power under the pleading standards articulated by the Federal Circuit in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  After analyzing each of the counterclaims and affirmative defenses at issue, Judge Stark recommended that defendant Fairchild’s motion be granted in part and denied in part.

 

In setting forth the applicable legal standard, Judge Stark recognized that “inequitable conduct, ‘while a broader concept than fraud, must be pled with particularity’ pursuant to rule 9(b).”  An individual involved with the filing and prosecution of a patent application engages in inequitable conduct when he or she makes an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, fails to disclose material information, or submits false material information to the Patent and Trademark Office (“ the PTO”) with specific intent to deceive the PTO.  Thus, “[a] pleading that simply avers the substantive elements of inequitable conduct, without setting forth the particularized factual bases for the allegation, does not satisfy Rule 9(b).”  Rather, as set forth in Exergen, in order “to plead the ‘circumstances’ of inequitable conduct with the requisite ‘particularity’ under Rule 9(b), the pleading must identify the specific who, what, when, where and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.”