By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. et al. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Civil Action No. 17-389-RGA (D.Del. June 29, 2018), the Court rendered its Markman ruling construing three (3) terms in dispute in the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,778,962 (“the ‘962 patent”) and 8,617,598 (“the ‘598 patent”).

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.

By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in Siemens Industry, Inc. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Tech. Corp. et al., Civil Action No. 16-284-LPS (D.Del. June 20, 2018), the Court denied Plaintiff Siemens Industry, Inc.’s motion asking the Court to reconsider its construction of the terms “vital” and “safety critical” provided in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 6, 2017. Defendants opposed the motion. Id. at *1.

Siemens argued that “reconsideration is required to correct certain factual and legal errors in the Court’s interpretation of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of record that resulted in erroneous constructions.” Id. at *2. Among other things, Siemens argued that, when the Court’s constructions are substituted for “vital” and “safety critical” in the claims, the claims no longer make grammatical sense. Id. at *3.

“Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.5, motions for reconsideration should be granted ‘sparingly.’” Id. at *1. The Court noted that motions for reconsideration may be granted only if the movant can show one of the following: (i) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (ii) new evidence is available that was not available when the court made its decision; and (iii) there is a need to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest injustice. Id. at *2. The Court did not find any reason warranting reconsideration and, therefore, denied Siemen’s motion. Id. at *3-4.

A copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in TQ Delta, LLC v. ZyXel Communications, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 13-02013-RGA (D.Del. June 12, 2018), the Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Expedited Consideration of a Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin Plaintiff from pursuing an action in the High Court of Justice of London, England against ZyXel UK and ZyXel Communications A/S (incorporated in Denmark) for infringement of two European patents. One of the two patents in suit in the UK action is the counterpart to the claims in the Family 5 patents asserted in the instant action. Id. at *2.

In denying Defendants’ motion, the Court explained that the Third Circuit has adopted the restrictive approach as a test for determining whether an anti-suit injunction should be entered to restrain the advancement of a foreign parallel proceeding. Id. at *3. Under the restrictive approach, anti-suit injunctions against foreign proceedings are rarely granted. Id. District courts may appropriately enjoin “foreign parallel proceedings only to protect jurisdiction or an important public policy.” Id. The Third Circuit’s jurisprudence instructs that, although comity is a consideration in federal and state litigation, comity should weigh even more heavily in the court’s analysis of anti-suit injunction in the international context. Id. Domestic and foreign parallel proceedings may ordinarily proceed simultaneously “at least until one has reached the stage where its ruling becomes res judicata.” Id.

Applying the restrictive approach to the circumstances in the instant action, the Court found that the UK action will not usurp this Court’s jurisdiction or threaten an important public policy. Id. at *4-8. Thus, the UK action should proceed parallel to the instant action, and an injunction is not warranted. Id.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.

Following a four-day bench trial before him in Shire Orphan Therapies LLC et al. v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, Civil Action No. 15-1102-GMS (D.Del. June 5, 2018), and having considered the entire record in the case and the applicable law, The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet issued the Court’s Memorandum setting forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the action including that (1) the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,648,333 (“the ‘333 Patent”) are not invalid in light of U.S. Patent No. 5,597,807 (“the ‘7803 Patent”) under the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting; and (2) the ‘333 Patent is not invalid due to prosecution laches because there was no unreasonable or unexplained delay in prosecuting the ‘333 patent.

A copy of the Memorandum setting forth the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in more detail is attached.

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet in SurgiQuest v. Lexion Medical, LLC., Civil Action No. 14-382-GMS (D.Del. May 16, 2018), the Court denied Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant SurgiQuest’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL Motion”) on the jury’s verdict which found that SurgiQuest had engaged in false and misleading advertising and unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act and Delaware common law and awarded monetary damages to Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff Lexion Medical, LLC. The Court also denied Lexion’s post-trial motions for permanent injunction, disgorgement of profits, attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest. Id. at *2. The Court granted Lexion’s motion for postjudgment interest. Id. at *26.

In support of its JMOL motion on the jury’s award of monetary damages, SurgiQuest asserted that no reasonable jury could have awarded money damages because (1) Lexion failed to prove causation between the false advertising claims and damages; (2) the jury instructions on causation and damages were incorrect; and (3) the Court improperly admitted hearsay and salesperson confusion evidence. Id. at *4. In response, Lexion contended that SurgiQuest could not prove a lack of sufficient evidence because the pertinent statements were literally false, consumers purchased SurgiQuest’s product and stopped purchasing Lexion’s product, and the evidence of confusion showed that the false advertising actually deceived a portion of the buying public. Id. at *5.

After considering the entire record in the case, including the evidence in the record, the parties’ post-trial submissions, and the applicable law, the Court agreed with Lexion and concluded that (1) the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that there was a causal connection between the false advertising by SurgiQuest and Lexion’s loss; (2) the jury instructions were proper; and (3) the statements alleged by SurgiQuest to be hearsay and salesperson confusion evidence were properly admitted. Id. at *5-13. The Court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict awarding punitive damages to Lexion. Id. at*13-17.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in TQ Delta, LLC v. Zyxel Communications, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 13-02013-RGA (D.Del. May 8, 2018) (consolidated), the Court rendered its Markman ruling construing thirteen (13) disputed terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 7,796,705 (“the ‘705 patent”), 8,335,956 (“the ‘956 patent”), 8,407,546 (“the ‘546 patent”), 8,468,411 (“the ‘411 patent”), 8,595,577 (“the ‘577 patent”), and 8,645,784 (“the ‘784 patent”).

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in State of Delaware v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al., Civil Action No. 18-383-RGA (D.Del. April 25, 2018), the Court granted Plaintiff State of Delaware’s Motion to Remand the action originally filed by Plaintiff in the Superior Court of Delaware against manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacy retailers of prescription opioids for their roles in Delaware’s opioid crisis. In granting the Motion to Remand the action back to Delaware Superior Court, the District Court found that it lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Id. at *2.

Specifically, in the action, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants created and fueled the opioid crisis in Delaware by violating the Delaware Controlled Substances Act and the Federal Controlled Substances Act, among other things. Id. However, in its Complaint, Plaintiff alleged only state law claims of consumer fraud, nuisance, negligence, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy against McKesson Corporation. Id. Nonetheless, McKesson filed a notice removing the action to the District of Delaware asserting that there was federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the Federal Controlled Substances Act. Id. at *2-3. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed its Motion to Remand the action back to Delaware Superior Court. Id. at *3.

Because there was no dispute that Plaintiff’s claims arose under state law, McKesson had to show that a federal issue is (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. Id. at *4. Ultimately, the Court found that “the federal issues in [the] case are not necessarily raised, substantial, and possible to entertain without disrupting the congressionally – approved balance between state and federal courts.” Id. at *11. Thus, the Court found that Plaintiff’s state law claims do not “arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States” and did not confer federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at *11.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet in Genentech, Inc. et al. v. Amgen Inc., Civil Action No. 17-1407-GMS (D.Del. April 17, 2018), the Court granted defendant Amgen’s motion to dismiss the claim of plaintiffs Genetech and City of Hope (collectively “Genetech”) requesting a declaratory judgment that Amgen cannot market Mvasi™ before December 18, 2018.

Mvasi™ is a biosimilar version of Genetech’s Avastin®. During the “patent dance” prescribed by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”), 42 U.S.C. § 262(l), Amgen made a statement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §262(l)(3)(B) that it did not intend to begin commercial marketing of Mvasi™ before December 18, 2018. Id. at *1. Amgen later provided notice that it would not start commercial marketing of Mvasi™ before April 4, 2018 – eight months earlier than the date it previously provided. Genetech filed its claim requesting a declaratory judgment seeking to enforce Amgen’s earlier representation that it would not commence the commercial marketing of Mvasi™ before December 18, 2018. Id. at *3. Amgen moved to dismiss Genetech’s commercial marketing claim asserting that it failed to state a claim and that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). Id. at *1.

Upon review, the Court determined there was not yet an “actual controversy” to warrant the Court exercising jurisdiction over Genentech’s commercial marketing claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. at *4. In other words, because it was already beyond April 4, 2018 and, other than the notice of commercial marketing, there was no indication that Mvasi™ had actually launched or would be launched before December 18, 2018, the commercial marketing claim was not of “sufficient immediacy” to warrant the issuance of a novel declaratory judgment. Id. The Court noted that, if the claim ripens into an “actual controversy” – meaning Amgen launches Mvasi™ before December 18, 2018 – there would be an opportunity for Genentech to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction at that time. Id.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached.